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Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of differential
pricing and QoS assignment by a broadband data provider. In
our model, the broadband data provider decides on the power
allocated to an end-user not only based on parameters of the
transmission medium, but also based on the price the user is
willing to pay. In addition, end-users bid the price that they are
willing to pay to the Base Station (BS) based on their channel
condition, the throughput they require, and their belief about
other users’ parameters. We will characterize the optimum power
allocation by the BS which turns out to be a modification of
the solution to the well-known water-filling problem. We also
characterize the optimum bidding strategy of end-users using
the belief of each user about the cell condition.
I. INTRODUCTION
The exponential growth of the demand for broadband data
in recent years and the high cost of network expansion led
broadband data providers to revise their policies and prices
imposed on content providers and end-users [1], [2]. An
evidence of such trend is the increasing incentive of broadband
data providers to change their flat-rate pricing scheme with a
more complex one to control the congestion on the network
and to increase their profit.
In this paper, we study the problem of differential pricing
and QoS assignment by a broadband data provider. In our
model, the broadband provider decides on the resources al-
located to an end-user, and subsequently the QoS seen by
that user, not only based on parameters of the transmission
medium, but also based on the price the user is willing to
pay. An FDMA system with a single Base Station (BS) is
considered. The BS has a limited downlink power budget,
and is willing to allocate the available power such that to
maximize the gross profit. An end-user bids the price that she
is willing to pay to the BS based on her own channel condition,
the throughput she requires, and her belief about other users’
parameters. Subsequently, the BS decides on the amount of
power she allocates to end-users based on the price they bid,
their channel quality, and the throughput needed by users.
Although the bidding scheme is not convenient to use by an
end-user in everyday data usage, this scheme can be used by
users with a bad channel quality and high valuation for data to
increase their throughput through appropriately adjusting their
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price. In addition, this gives an end-user with a good channel
quality the ability to use data for a cheaper price. Another
application for this scheme is primary/secondary markets [4].
In this paper, we will characterize the optimum power
allocation by the BS. We will show that the solution to this
problem is a modification of the solution to the well-known
water-filling [5] problem. We also characterize the optimum
bidding strategy of end-users using the belief of each user
about the cell condition. Furthermore, we will investigate the
relation between the communication parameters of a user and
the price she pays and subsequently the allocated power to
her using simulations. The social welfare of end-users is also
compared in two cases: (i) the mentioned differential QoS and
pricing scheme and (ii) the flat-rate pricing scheme.
The problem of resource allocation through pricing in wired
and wireless networks has received a lot of attention [6] -
[10]. In most of the works about pricing-based power control
in wireless networks, such as [6]-[8], the problem of power
control in uplink of a cellular network is considered. However,
[9] and [10] investigated the problem of downlink power
allocation in a CDMA system. The closest work to ours is
[10]. In [10], authors investigated a bidding scheme in which
users bid for a time-frame, and the BS allocates the time-frame
based on prices and channel qualities. Authors focused on the
macro-level view of the interaction between the BS and end-
users, and do not involve wireless intricacies in the model.
The decisions of users are considered to be made independent
of each other and based on a demand function. They mainly
focus on the optimal allocation and revenue given the price
vector, and do not characterize the optimum bidding strategies
of users. By characterizing the demand function, we capture
the nature of end-user’s optimization, and characterize both
the optimum allocation and bidding strategies.
Another distinction of our work with previous works is to
consider more strategic users that only pay for the amount of
data they need. In other words, users have a desired throughput
that needs to be met, and they only pay for the data up to their
desired throughput and not more.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe
the model and formulate a two stage optimization problem. In
Section III, we solve the optimization problems and charac-
terize the optimum power allocation and bidding strategies.
Simulation results are presented in Section IV. We conclude
the paper and present future works in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider an FDMA system with parallel broadcast
Gaussian channels in a single cell with one Base Station (BS).
The base station has a down-link power budget of Φ. Without
loss of generality, the total power budget is assumed to be
one unit, i.e. Φ = 1, otherwise, simply normalize all power
quantities, including noise, by Φ. Consider a group of n ≥ 2
mobile end-users indexed by i. The channel attenuation to
the user i is denoted by hi, and each user i has a desired
throughput of bi bits/s. In order to have a non-trivial problem,
suppose that the BS is overloaded with the demand, i.e., the
power budget is not sufficient to satisfy the demand of all
end-users.
Users bid a price, ci, that they are willing to pay for one
unit of data to the BS. Subsequently, the BS decides on the
fraction of power she will assign to user i depending on the
price this user bids (ci), the channel quality, and the desired
throughput (bi). Thus, we formulate the problem as a two-stage
optimization problem:
(1) In the first stage, end-user i decides to bid a price ci per
bit of data to maximize her expected utility function:
Ui(ci,~c−i) = (vi − ci)Ti(ci,~c−i) (1)
where vi > 0 is the valuation of end-user i for one bit of data,
and Ti(ci, c−i) is the expected throughput of i when she bids
the price ci per bit and other users bid the vector of price ~c−i.
By Shannon formula,
Ti(ci,~c−i) = log2(1 + SNRi) (2)
SNRi =
hiP
∗
i
Ni
= qiP
∗
i ,
where q := hi
Ni
is the channel quality. In addition, Ni and
P ∗i are the power of noise for i and the expected dedicated
downlink power of the BS to end-user i, respectively. Note
that in the Shannon formula, without loss of generality, the
bandwidth is taken to be 1. Furthermore, in (2), SNRi is the
signal to noise ratio of the user i.
We assumed that each end-user is assigned a distinct fre-
quency channel and the interference between channels are
assumed to be negligible. In addition, Pi is dependent on the
price a user bids and is determined by the BS in the second
stage of the optimization problem.
In this paper, we assume that an end-user is aware of her
own channel quality and throughput she needs, and holds a
belief over other users’ parameters.
(2) In the second stage, the BS decides on the optimum
power allocation knowing the channel quality of end-users,
throughput they need, and the price they bid. The goal of
the BS is to maximize her revenue. The revenue of the BS
depends on the price a user pays per bit, ci, times the number
of bits of data she uses. Thus, the revenue of the BS is∑
i ci log2(1 + SNRi). This expression should be maximize
by the BS given the prices that end-users bid in the previous
stage and the channel quality of users. Therefore, the following
optimization problem is solved by the BS:
min
~P
−
∑
i
ci log2(1 + qiPi) (3)
s.t.
log2(1 + qiPi) ≤ bi ∀i (4)
Pi ≥ 0 ∀i (5)∑
i
Pi = 1 (6)
The constraint (4) reflects the desired throughput of a user.
Thus, in the optimum allocation, the BS provides at most bi
bits for i. The constraint (6) resulted from the power budget
of the BS and the assumption that the system is overloaded.
In the next section, we characterize the optimum power
allocation strategy for the base station and the optimum
bidding strategy for end-users.
III. OPTIMUM ALLOCATION AND BIDDING STRATEGIES
We proceed to solve the problem in a reverse order. First
we start with the BS problem (Section III-A) for allocating the
power. Then we characterize the optimum bidding strategies
for end-users using the optimum allocation strategy obtained
by solving the BS problem (Section III-B).
A. BS Problem
The optimization problem (3)-(6) is a modified version of
the conventional water-filling problem. In the conventional
water-filling the objective function is merely the sum of
throughputs, while in (3) the objective function is the weighted
sum of the throughput of end-users in which the weights are
the price per bit that a user is willing to pay. In addition, (4)
is an extra constraint to ensure that the allocated throughput
to a user does not exceed the demand of that user. We will
prove that the solution to this optimization problem is also
a modified version of the conventional solution to the water-
filling problem.
Similar to the water-filling problem, the BS problem is a
convex programming problem. Thus KKT conditions provides
the necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal solution,
i.e. ~P ∗. The stationarity condition in KKT is as follows:
γ∗i − ci
1
qi
+ P ∗i
− λ∗i + η
∗ = 0 ∀i (7)
where γi, λi, and η are Lagrange multipliers associated with
(4), (5), and (6), respectively. The parameter λ∗i works similar
to a slack variable. Thus ci−γ
∗
i
1
qi
+P∗
i
≤ η∗. If ci−γ
∗
i
1
qi
> η∗, then
P ∗i > 0, and from complementary slackness, λ∗i = 0. Thus
ci−γ
∗
i
1
qi
+P∗i
= η∗. On the other hand, if ci−γ
∗
i
1
qi
< η∗, then P ∗i = 0.
Therefore,
P ∗i = max{0,
ci − γ
∗
i
η∗
−
1
qi
} = (
ci − γ
∗
i
η∗
−
1
qi
)+ (8)
which is dependent on dual parameters η∗ and γ∗i . Thus,
Theorem III.1. The solution to the minimization problem
(3)-(6) is P ∗i = ( ci−γ
∗
i
η∗
− 1
qi
)+ where η∗ and γ∗i are the
optimum dual parameters.
Discussion:The solution, P ∗i = ( ciη∗−(
γ∗i
η∗
+ 1
qi
))+, is slightly
different from water-filling, in the sense that the flood level
( ci
η∗
) is different for each user, and is dependent on ci, i.e. the
price the user pays.
Either end-user i receives the desired throughput, i.e.,
log2(1 + qiP
∗
i ) = bi, or not, i.e., log2(1 + qiP ∗i ) < bi. In
the latter case, γ∗i = 0, and the throughput of the user i is
log2(1 + qi(
ci
η∗
− 1
qi
)+). Thus in this case, the throughput is
either zero if ci
η∗
− 1
qi
≤ 0, or log2(qi
ci
η∗
) if ci
η∗
− 1
qi
> 0.
Therefore the throughput of the end-user is a non-decreasing
function of ci and qi:
T (ci,~c−i) =
{
min{log2(qi
ci
η∗
), bi} if ci ≥ η
∗
qi
0 if ci < η
∗
qi
Discussion: There exists a saturation level for each user. In
the saturation level, log2(1 + qiP ∗i ) = bi. In other words, the
saturated level of the allocated power occurs when the desired
throughput is met.
Note that the dual parameter η∗ (7) depends on all players’
prices (including i) and their channel quality. This parameter
is important in determining the flood level. Intuitively from
(6) and (8), we can say that a higher η∗ is associated with
a more congested cell, users that are willing to pay more for
data, or lower quality of channels1. From this point on, we
call η∗ the cell condition. In section III-B, we will observe
that the belief of end-users about this parameter is important
in their decision making about the price they bid.
B. End-User Problem
Now, consider the bidding problem for end-users. We will
characterize the optimum solution(s) for the problem.
In our setting, users want to bid a price to maximize their
utility function which is a decreasing function of the price they
bid and an increasing function of their expected throughput:
max
ci>0
Ui(ci) =
max
ci>0
(
(vi − ci)min{bi,max{0, log2(qi
ci
ηi(ci)
)}}
) (9)
In (9), log2(qi ciηi(ci) ) is the expected throughput resulted from
the optimum power allocation done by the BS in the previous
section, and ηi(ci) is the belief of player i about the η∗ in (7).
Note that users do not know the actual value of η∗, and the
belief of a user about the cell condition is dependent on the
price paid by that user. We will later discuss more about the
belief function.
1This is not a proof. In the actual proof, one should note that γ∗
i
is changing.
Bidding the price ci = 0 yields a throughput of zero.
Therefore the optimization is on prices greater than zero,
and the price that user i chooses is in the set (0, c¯i], where
c¯i = inf{ci : log2(qi
ci
ηi(ci)
) = bi}. This happens because
Ti(ci,~c−i) ≤ bi for all ci. Thus for ci > c¯i, Ui(ci) <
(vi − c¯i)bi = Ui(c¯i). Therefore, player i does not choose a
price higher than c¯i. In other words, c¯i is the smallest price
by which a user can expect to receive the full throughput
she needs. In addition, by choosing ci = vi, a user can
secure the payoff of zero. Thus, the optimum price should
be in the interval of (0,min{c¯i, vi}]. We call the interval
(0,min{c¯i, vi}] the feasible price interval.
Now, consider the maximization (9) on the feasible interval:
max
ci∈(0,min{c¯i,vi}]
(vi − ci) log2(qi
ci
ηi(ci)
) (10)
The optimum bidding strategy is found by using the first
order optimality condition:
dUi(ci)
dci
= − log2(qi
ci
ηi(ci)
)+(vi−ci)(
1
ci
−
η′i(ci)
ηi(ci)
) = 0 (11)
Let Ai denote the set of solutions to the equation (11). The
set of candidate optimum solutions, A∗i , is the set of prices
that are in the interval (0,min{c¯i, vi}] and satisfy the second
order condition. In other words, A∗i = {c : c ∈ Ai, c ∈
(0,min{c¯i, vi}], and d
2Ui
dc2
i
|ci=c < 0}. The optimum bidding
price is:
c∗i = argmax{Ui(c) : c ∈ A∗i or c = min{c¯i, vi}}
Next, we will explain more about the belief function and
provide a sample belief function for the end-users.
The Belief Function: The belief function of a user is an
important factor in determining the optimum bid by that user.
One method by which end-users can obtain this belief function
is to guess and update their belief for the cell condition by
monitoring the price bid by users and channel qualities of
different users for a particular interval of time. This update
process is beyond the scope of this paper.
As an another method, the belief function for the cell
condition can be provided for end-users by the BS at the
beginning of a time-slot. Note that the BS is aware of all
channel qualities, but is not aware of the bids submitted by
users before announcing the belief function. Thus, the BS can
only announce an approximation of η∗ as the belief function
to end-users.
An end-user expects that the belief function satisfies some
properties. We call such a function a consistent belief function:
Definition III.1. A consistent belief function is a function
which is non-decreasing with respect to ci, and is increasing
if the user believes that she will receive a positive power
quota and the demand of the user is not met, i.e, when
0 < log2(1 + qi(
ci
ηi(ci)
− 1
qi
)) < bi.
The reason for consistency of such belief is discussed in the
following discussion:
Discussion: Given the belief finction, ηi(ci), and from (6)
and (8), ∑j ( cj−γ∗jηi(ci) − 1qj )+ = 1. Suppose that cj for j 6= i is
held constant and c′i < c′′i . Let η′∗ and η′′∗ to be the belief of
the user i about the optimum dual variables associated with
c′i and c′′i , respectively.
The claim follows by vacuity if c′i = c¯i, i.e. log2(1 +
qi(
ci
ηi(ci)
− 1
qi
)+) = bi for the price c′i.
Trivially, if ( ci−γ
∗
i
ηi(ci)
− 1
qi
)+ = 0 for ci = c′i and ci = c′′i , then
the belief about the optimal allocation is unchanged. Therefore
η′∗ = η′′∗.
Now consider the case that 0 < log2(1+qi( ciηi(ci)−
1
qi
)) < bi
for ci = c′i. Take c′′i = c′i + ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is small enough to
ensure that ci
ηi(ci)
− 1
qi
does not exceed bi. Suppose that ηi(ci)
is not a strictly increasing function of ci. Therefore, η′∗ ≥
η′′∗, and P ′beliefi = (
c′i
η′∗
− 1
qi
)+ < (
c′′i
η′′∗
− 1
qi
)+ = P ′′beliefi .
In other words, the belief of the user about her power quota
is increased. In addition the power quota of other users is
unchanged or increased, i.e. P ′beliefj ≤ P
′′belief
j for j 6= i.
Thus
∑
j P
′′belief
j > 1, which is inconsistent with the belief
of a user about the optimization done in the BS side.
Note that the belief function is determined by the history
or is provided by the BS and potentially can be any function.
However, as discussed above, a function with above-
mentioned properties is more consistent. In the following
theorem, we present the relation between the price a user
bids and her belief about the power quota she gets, when
users are provided with a consistent belief.
Theorem III.2. When users are provided with a consistent
belief, the belief of a user about the power allocated to her
is a non-decreasing function of the price she bids for prices
in the feasible interval, and it is an increasing function of the
price she bids when the user believes that she will receive a
positive power quota and the demand of the user is not met.
Proof: If ( ci
ηi(ci)
− 1
qi
)+ = 0, the result follows from (5).
The theorem holds by vacuity if log2(1 + qi ciηi(ci) −
1
qi
) = bi.
Now consider the case that 0 < log2(1+qi( ciηi(ci) −
1
qi
)) < bi.
Suppose that P beliefi = ciηi(ci) −
1
qi
is not increasing with
respect to ci . The demand is consistent, therefore ηi(ci) is
increasing function of ci. Thus, P beliefj for j 6= i decreases as
ci increases. Therefore
∑
k P
belief
k decreases from one. This
is a contradiction with (6). The result follows.
Next, we will present an example for the belief of end-users
about the cell condition and characterize the optimum bidding
strategy for this belief.
Example III.1. Simple Belief- Let the set Qi denote the set
of users that end-user i believes that they receive a positive
throughput. Note that in this simple belief function, Qi is
assumed by i to be independent of ci. In general, Qi would be
a set that is decreasing in size with respect to ci. We introduce
parameters Ci =
∑
j∈Qi
cˆij and Bi =
∑
j∈Qi
1
qˆij
, where cˆij
and qˆij are the belief of user i about other user’s price and
channel quality. Using (6), for all i,
ci
ηi(ci)
−
1
qi
+
∑
j∈Qi
(
cˆij
ηi(ci)
−
1
qˆij
) = 1
Therefore the belief function of the user i is:
ηi(ci) =
ci +
∑
Qi
cˆij
1 + 1
qi
+
∑
Qi
1
qˆij
=
ci + Ci
1 + 1
qi
+Bi
(12)
With this belief function, d2Ui(ci)
dc2
i
< 0 for all feasible ci. This
implies that (11) has at most one solution in the feasible
interval. The solution to the equation (11) is the unique
optimum bidding strategy for end-user i if it is in the interval
(0,min{c¯i, vi}); otherwise, user i bids min{c¯i, vi}.
A possible implementation scheme for this type of belief
function is that the BS announces Ci and Bi at the beginning
of each time-slot to the end-user i. Subsequently users use
these value to calculate their bids.
In the next section, we present some numerical results using
the simple belief function for the cell condition.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
First we consider a cell consists of a BS and four end-users.
We assume that the BS is aware of qi’s and vi’s and announces
parameters Ci and Bi to each user i as follows:
Ci =
1
2
∑
j 6=i
vj
Bi =
∑
j 6=i
1
qj
The goal of the first set of simulation is to observe the
relationship between parameters of a user, i.e. bi, qi, and
vi, with the price she bids and the power allocated to her.
We consider three cases. In each case, one of the previously
mentioned parameters are different among users and others
are the same. Note that we normalized the bandwidth and the
power budget to one; therefore all other parameters should be
scaled appropriately.
Case 1: In this case, vi = 1 and qi = 2 for all end-users.
The vector of the desired throughputs is ~b = [0.1, 0.5, 1, 2].
The price vector bid by users can be found to be ~c =
[0.33, 0.46, 0.53, 0.53] which is non-decreasing with respect
to the throughput needed by a user. The allocated power (red
part), the reverse of channel quality (blue part), and ci
η∗
(sum
of the blue and red parts) are plotted in Figure 1.a. Simulation
confirms that since all users have the same quality of channel,
higher price bid by a user is associated with more power
allocated to that user, and consequently a higher throughput.
Thus, users with higher level of desired throughout, bid higher
prices to secure higher throughputs.
Case 2: Now consider vi = 1 and bi = 1.5 for all
users. The vector of channel qualities is ~q = [1, 2, 3, 4].
The vector of price bid by end-users in this case is ~c =
[0.83, 0.52, 0.43, 0.38] which is decreasing with respect to the
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channel quality of a user. In addition, the vector of final
throghputs is ~T = [0.24, 0.58, 0.88, 1.11] which is increasing
by qi. We can see, in Figure 1.b, that the allocated power to
different users is approximately equal for all users in spite
of difference in channel qualities. The reason is because of
differential pricing scheme.
Case 3: In this case, consider bi = 1.5 and qi = 2 for all
users. The vector of valuations is ~v = [1, 2, 3, 4]. The vector of
price bid by each user is ~c = [0.94, 1.22, 1.42, 1.55] which is
increasing with respect to the valuation each user has for data.
As we can see in Figure 1.c, since users with higher valuation
for data bid more generously, they obtain a higher fraction of
the BS power budget.
In another scenario, we want to investigate the effect of this
differential QoS scheme on the social welfare of the cell. Here,
the social welfare is defined as the sum of the payoffs of all
end-users:
SW =
∑
i
Ui(ci,~c−i) =
∑
i
(vi − ci)Ti(c
∗
i ,~c−i)
We consider a cell with one BS and 10 end-users. The
belief function is as before. The valuation of users for data is
distributed uniformly in the interval [0, R], and the simulation
is done for R = [0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3]. We consider bi = 1.5
and qi = 2 for all users. In order to alleviate the effect of
randomness in results, simulation is repeated 50 times for each
value of R. The reported social welfare is the average of social
welfare values resulted in these 50 iterations.
Two cases are investigated: (i) Differential pricing and QoS
scenario. In this case, ci is the the optimum bidding price
chosen by the end-user i. (ii) Ordinary Water-Filling Scheme
in which the BS allocates her power merely based on the
channel quality of users and charges all users a flat rate of c.
For the sake of comparison, we consider c to be the average
price chosen by users in scenario (i).
Results are plotted in figure 2. Results reveal that the social
welfare in the differential QoS scenario is larger than the social
welfare in ordinary water-filling. Furthermore, the difference
between the social welfare of two cases is increasing with the
range of user’s valuation for data.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
We studied the problem of power allocation in the downlink
of an FDMA system by a BS that decides on the allocation
based on the price users bid, their desired throughput, and their
channel qualities. The optimum power allocation and bidding
strategies were characterized.
In the future, we will extend our results to the CDMA-
SINR frameworks (where the bandwidth is fully shared). This
scenario have a similar form of throughput function to that of
the SNR-FDMA framework we have studied. For the CDMA
case under overload conditions (∑i Pi = 1),
Ti(~c) = log2(1 + SINRi) = − log2(1− q˜iPi)
where q˜i = hi/(hi + Ni) = qi/(1 + qi), which is increasing
in i’s channel quality, qi.
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